THIS APPEAL INVOLVES A QUESTION OF CHILD CUSTODY, ADOPTION, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OR OTHER MATTER AFFECTING THE BEST INTERESTS OF A CHILD

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Brian Lovett, Pro Se
1416 W Wolfram St., #1
Chicago, IL 60657-4117
(312) 529-1500
blovett@chicagogsb.edu

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PRAYER FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315, Brian Lovett, Pro Se (hereinafter “Brian”), petitions this Court for leave to appeal from the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, in which the court affirmed multiple Illinois statutes and rules, as well as multiple orders of the Circuit Court of Cook County against Petitioner and in favor or Respondent, Laurie Lovett (hereinafter “Laurie”).

JURISDICTION

The appellate court’s opinion was filed on November 21, 2006 affirming the circuit court’s judgment. Appendix at 1 (“A1”). [1] No petition for rehearing was filed.

POINTS RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL

Despite the well-settled precedent that when a state law or rule affects fundamental rights, the traditional standard of appellate review is abandoned, there is no presumption of constitutionality, and the court is required to apply “strict scrutiny,” and which is cited in so many cases that Brian would likely use up his 20-page limit with just those references (e.g., see Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 476 (2000); Langman v. Langman, 325 Ill.App.3d 101, at para. 32 (2001) [2]; People of the State of Illinois v. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 328 at para. 45 and 47 (1989 ); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980)), the First District rendered a decision that completely ignores these basic legal principles. After ignoring these principles that are the fountainhead of all statutory reviews impacting fundamental rights, the First District easily applied its overused and incorrect case law to deny Brian and his daughter their fundamental rights. The appellate court’s decision presents four distinct issues, each of which warrants this Court’s review and associated reversal under the criteria specified in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(a).

First, as previously discussed, the First District completely ignored the most important legal principles and the starting point of all reviews where fundamental rights are implicated: strict scrutiny. This one issue alone cries out for an immediate review by this Court. If this Court is willing to also ignore this basic (and intentional) legal error, thus treating it as legitimate and reinforcing the renegade behavior, then fundamental rights no longer exist as the rule of law will not protect or enforce them.

Second, the First District ignored every U.S. Supreme Court case, over 80 years of decisions, dealing with “fit” parents, children, and the counterfeit “best interest of the child” standard. Instead, and citing the off-point and irrelevant case Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (which is specifically about race classifications and only references the best interest of the child standard in one sentence), the First District falsely and incorrectly tried to assert that the U.S. Supreme Court believes a “substantial governmental interest” is equal to a “compelling state interest” reviewed under the required strict scrutiny standard (A4), even though the U.S. Supreme Court specifically asserts in the referenced case that such statutes are “subject to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.” Id., at 432. To add insult to injury, the First District hypocritically continues its miserable behavior by using as support an unpublished Illinois Supreme Court decision, In re A.W.J., 197 Ill. 2d 492 (2001) (A4), clearly displaying its double-standard relative to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23, and which does not have anything to do with fit parents (discusses which “nonparents” (i.e., grandparents) get custody of a child after the father killed the mother and the father later dies, and clearly indicates that “the parental interests sought to be protected… are no longer at issue in this case because [the father] has died” Id., at para. 21). This Court’s review will prevent the manifest disregard, discombobulation, and nullification of over 80 years of U.S. Supreme Court crystal clear decisions regarding fit parents, children, and the best interest of the child standard.

Third, the First District ignored crystal clear and undisputed facts, sometimes while simultaneously ignoring on-point appellate cases and a 7th Circuit case.

Fourth, the First District blatantly ignored clear-cut evidence of perjury. Instead of acknowledging 70 direct contradictions made by Laurie and her attorneys, which are not in dispute, the First District cowered behind its unsubstantiated assertion that “Brian has failed to make any showing that Laurie and her attorneys made false representations.” (A10) Brian knows that perjury is standard practice in divorce courts and that reviewing courts pay almost no heed to the immoral and illegal practice. Brian hopes it would be obvious to this Court that, by making even only a few examples to clamp-down on clear-cut perjury and the judges that let it slide, the immoral and illegal standard practice would disappear almost overnight. Ergo, assuming this Court is interested in displaying its integrity and improving the integrity of divorce courts, review is unquestionably warranted.

Brian fully understands that by using strict scrutiny to provide a thorough and honest review of this case, this Court runs the risk of implicating many decisions made regarding divorce over the last 30+ years. Brian also understands that the political upheaval and financial disintegration of most divorce attorneys makes a likely review or reversal untenable, no matter how morally correct it would be. While being stripped of all of his natural rights as a parent, and being reduced to a mere “visitor” in his daughter’s life, Brian has had the courage and commitment to learn the law himself and stand-up alone against those who have degrees in law, all for the primary purpose of making sure his daughter has a close and continuing relationship with both parents equally. Brian suggests that the courage and commitment required to do that as his child is ripped out of his life is much more than that required for this Court to admit past errors and truly protect our children’s safety from the state. And, it is not like this Court lacks a model. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).

Statement of Facts

Brian filed for divorce from his wife Laurie on April 28, 2000, approximately five months after the birth of their daughter Samantha Lovett (hereinafter “Samantha”) and 2.5 years after they were married. In July, 2000, the parties attempted to reconcile, but after struggling for eleven months, both agreed they could not.

Brian’s first attorney fired Brian as a client in court when he refused to accept a visitation schedule proposed by the trial judge and the Guardian Ad Litem for four out of fourteen days. Shortly after Brian hired a replacement attorney, the parties negotiated an agreement that attempted to set-out the temporary and permanent disposition of some of the most contentious topics while the divorce was pending (e.g., custody, parenting schedules, living arrangements, child support, future income and expenses, property). Brian later fired his second attorney. Subsequently, Brian filed his appearance as Pro Se seeking to have multiple Illinois statutes and rules related to divorce declared unconstitutional.

Brian is challenging the constitutionality of all Illinois statutes that refer to the “best interest of the child” (i.e., 750 ILCS 5/ 602, 603, 604, 607, 609, 610, 503 (g), and 506, as well as any other sections and rules that refer to “best interest of the child”) (hereinafter “Best Interest of the Child Statutes” ), on their face and as applied, which compel the state’s judiciary to make “awards” of child custody and parenting time, or allocation of parental responsibilities, privileges, and parenting time, or assignment of “guardians” and “evaluators,” within the context of dissolution of marriage actions and post-decree dissolution of marriage actions concerning children. Brian contends that the challenged statutes and rules violate well-recognized fundamental rights, including the right to due process, the right to equal protection, the right to privacy, and the right to the care, custody, control, companionship, and nurture of one’s offspring embodied in the fundamental liberty interest in family, which rights are secured by the Fourteenth Amendment . Brian is seeking that the challenged “best interest” statutes and rules are declared unconstitutional. These challenges/questions were presented in Brian’s Trial Brief (R. Vol. 5-9: C1085-2020), his Summary of Constitutional Arguments trial pleading (R. Vol. 9-10: C2225-2237), and extensively throughout the trial.

Additionally, Brian also is challenging the constitutionality of all “child support” statutes (750 ILCS 5/ 505, and associated sections 501 (a), 507, 510 (a), 510 (e), 510 (f), and 513, as well as any other sections and rules that refer to “child support” ) (hereinafter “Child Support Statutes”), the maintenance statutes (750 ILCS 5/ 504, and associated sections 501 (a), 507, and 510 (a), as well as any other sections and rules that refer to “maintenance” ) (hereinafter “Maintenance Statutes”), and the attorneys’ fee statutes (750 ILCS 5/ 501 (c)(1), 503 (j), and 508, as well as any other sections within 750 ILCS 5 and rules that refer to “attorneys’ fees” ) (hereinafter “Attorneys’ Fees Statutes”), as well as parts 13.3.1 and 13.3.2 of the Rules of the Circuit Court of Cook County (hereinafter “Mandatory Disclosure Rules”) and Illinois Supreme Court Rules 201 through 214 (hereinafter “Discovery Rules”). Brian contends that these statutes and rules are directly and egregiously violative of the Federal Constitution and Illinois Constitution . Specifically, Brian contends that the statutes and rules are unconstitutional on their face [3] and as applied because they violate the fundamental rights to equal protection, to due process, to privacy, to property, and to proscriptions about involuntary servitude, all of which are guaranteed to Brian under the Federal Constitution . Further, Brian contends the statutes are unconstitutional as applied because they violate his rights to not be imprisoned for debt and for proscriptions about private takings for private use or public use, all guaranteed to him under the Illinois Constitution . As with the Best Interest of the Child Statutes, these challenges/questions were also presented in Brian’s Trial Brief, his Summary of Constitutional Arguments trial pleading, and extensively throughout the trial.

Brian and Laurie are both fit parents and Samantha was a happy and healthy child, as Laurie’s attorney confirmed on the second day of trial: “fitness is not an issue in this case.” (S.R. Vol. 3: 105 lines 2-4).The trial court indicated that “I don't have the State alleging neglect or abuse or dependency.” (S.R. Vol. 3: 111 lines 1-2). (See also: R. Vol. 10: C2260 para. 17; R. Vol. 10: C2265; R. Vol. 10: C2287 para. 71; R. Vol. 10: C2287 para. 72; R. Vol. 10: C2293 para. 95; R. Vol. 10: C2294 para. 97; R. Vol. 10: C2297 para. 111; see also Laurie’s testimony (e.g., S.R. Vol. 7: 92-102, 151-153; Vol. 9: 97 lines 9-14; see also Laurie’s attorney’s argument: Vol. 11: 54 lines 2-7)).

On June 1, 2004, approximately ten months after an eighteen-day, non-jury trial, the circuit court entered a Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage (hereinafter “Judgment”) denying Brian’s request to find the referenced statutes and rules unconstitutional. Additionally in its Judgment, the circuit court, intra alia, awarded sole custody of Samantha to Laurie with visitation for Brian, ordered Brian to pay child support, divided up the parties’ assets, ordered the sale of the marital residence, and ruled on other outstanding requests. On June 11, 2004, the circuit court ordered a permanent injunction against Brian on his communications with his daughter. As Judge R. Morgan Hamilton summarized:

“We've got one child, we've got two parents. We will always have the one child and two parents, and you will be the parents of this child forever and ever, and the mom will be the mom of this child forever and ever. The dad will be the dad of this child forever and ever. But what we have is a situation… where mom and dad will no longer be living together in the same house with the child. So what do we do to make sure that that little one has a meaningful relationship with mom and dad, and [what] do we do to make sure that dad and mom have meaningful relationships with this child? That's what our case is about.” (A26)

On August 3, 2004, two months after a Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage was entered, Laurie filed her Petition to Modify Child Support. On August 23, 2004, Laurie filed her Petition for Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs for Defense of Appeal, requesting that the trial court withhold $79,645 from Brian’s “share of the net proceeds from the sale of the former marital residence.” On December 14, 2004, Laurie filed her Supplemental Petition for Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs for Defense of Appeal requesting that the trial court increase the withholding to $81,620.

In his responses to the petitions, Brian again challenged the Best Interest of the Child Statutes, the Child Support Statutes, the Attorneys’ Fees Statutes, the Mandatory Disclosure Rules, and the Discovery Rules. Additionally, Brian requested a trial by jury and challenged the constitutionality of 750 ILCS 5/103.

On December 15, 2004, the circuit court entered an order denying all of Brian’s constitutional challenges and awarding Laurie both the child support sought and the attorneys’ fees sought.

Argument

I. As the lower court completely ignored the most important legal principles required as the basis for its review, this Court should review to reinforce that when a state law or rule affects fundamental rights, the traditional standard of appellate review is abandoned, there is no presumption of constitutionality, and the court is required to apply “strict scrutiny”

These are not legal principles that are in dispute in any court in America. As both the U.S. and Illinois Supreme Courts have made undoubtedly clear, a review of statutes that impinge on fundamental rights must only use “exacting” strict scrutiny. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). Brian made it the very first part of his Appellate Brief to make sure it could not be missed, reasserted it at the start of his Supplemental Brief, and then repeated it again as the very first part of his Reply Brief. The First District ignored it entirely. Ergo, the First District erred as a matter of law by failing to apply the correct standard of review to state actions which implicate liberty interests and fundamental rights. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).

The Judgment states: “That the Wife, LAURIE LOVETT, shall have the sole care, custody, control and education of the minor child of the parties, SAMANTHA LOVETT.” (R. Vol. 10: C114). Equal to Laurie, there cannot be any question that Brian had a fundamental constitutionally-protected right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his child before filing for divorce (e.g., see “rights to… raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,'… 'basic civil rights of man'” Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 771 (1975); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); “[T]he liberty… to direct the upbringing and education of children… are among the basic civil rights of man” (citations omitted) (Stevens concurring) Thornburgh v. American Coll. Of Obst. & Syn., 476 U.S. 747, 773 (1986)). However, subsequent to receiving the Judgment from the circuit court, Brian no longer had “essential,” “basic civil rights of man” anymore, as the circuit court ripped them away from him. The faulty decision by the circuit court, and upheld by the appellate court, used the state statutes and procedures to negatively alter Brian’s parental rights without the due process and equal protection required by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Fundamental rights “…must be evaluated under a strict scrutiny analysis. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d at 476, 739 N.E.2d at 532. To withstand the strict scrutiny test, a statute must serve a compelling state interest, and the statute must be narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest.” Langman v. Langman, at para. 32. This Court wrote specifically that a compelling interest is not invoked just because parents divorce:

“The State maintains that it has an interest under these circumstances in protecting these children whose lives have been disrupted because of their parents’ divorce. This interest is nothing like the compelling interests involved in cases such as R.G. and Prince. Moreover, the parents in this case, Michael and Kiley Lulay, have not been alleged to be unfit. We therefore presume that they are acting in the best interests of their children. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 58, 120 S. Ct. at 2061.” Lulay v. Lulay, at para. 73. See also Langman v. Langman, at para. 32.

Like the right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of a child, the right to property is also fundamental. Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884). A statute, by its mere existence “on the books,” cannot overcome fundamental individual rights and liberty interests. Troxel v. Granville, at 65. There must exist a compelling state interest before the state can impair fundamental rights, even in the face of apparent statutory empowerment to the contrary, as evidenced by the fact that the standard of review of such a decision is one of strict scrutiny.

“The Supreme Court has further held that an individual's freedom of choice concerning… family life is a fundamental right. Thus, statutes restricting that right may only survive if a compelling State interest exists… Although the State neither takes the minor out of the home nor alters the parents' temporary or permanent custody of the minor, the State nevertheless intercedes, on behalf of the minor, in the family relationship. Thus, the MRAI significantly interferes with the family relationship and can only be justified if the State has a compelling interest.” People of the State of Illinois v. R.G., at para. 45-47.

What was the circuit court’s narrowly tailored, compelling interest in taking Brian’s fundamental rights away from him? As this Court immortalized in Lulay v. Lulay, at para. 73, it could not have been the divorce. The First Circuit did not even attempt to come up with a compelling interest. Additionally, and not that the appellate court even used any standard of scrutiny, courts may NOT use intermediate scrutiny because it is not the heightened scrutiny required when fundamental interests are implicated.Troxel v. Granville, at 65; Lulay v. Lulay, at 532. “[I]f a law "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution [it] is presumptively unconstitutional.” Harris v. McRae, at 312. Therefore, all challenged statutes and rules are presumptively unconstitutional.

Maybe because the appellate court does not consider itself a protector of the “essential,” “basic civil rights of man,” the First District does not hide its lack of any proper procedure to summarily dismiss Brian’s constitutional challenges. Stanley v. Illinois, at 650-651. Yet, procedural due process issues require a two-step analysis. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977).

In response to Brian’s assertion in his Appellate Brief that “when a state law or rule affects fundamental rights, the traditional standard of appellate review is abandoned, there is no presumption of constitutionality, and the court is required to apply “strict scrutiny” (A30), Laurie conceded this most critical point as she cowered with “[n]o response is made” in her Appellee Brief. As the rogue appellate court has ignored it, this Court must clearly reassert that, consistent with every other decision regarding fundamental rights: a “substantial” interest is not a “compelling” interest; a divorce does not trigger a compelling interest; in addition to a compelling interest, strict scrutiny continues to be the requirement for all alleged fundamental right infringements, and; these statutes fail under it.

II. The lower court’s decision conflicts with all relevant and controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent – therefore, review is warranted because of the importance of this question: is fitness the only legal criterion for infringing on a parent’s fundamental right, a right that the U.S. Supreme Court considers “cardinal?”

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that “until the state proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of the natural relationship.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982). The First District erred as a matter of law by: a) refusing to acknowledge that fit parents are vested with a liberty interest in their children; b) by avoiding a determination that a parent’s rights are fundamental, and; c) by sanctioning a divorce court’s actions to deprive a biological parent of equal custodial parenting status without a finding that Brian was an unfit parent. By ignoring every U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with fit parents, children, and the counterfeit best interest of the child standard, the First District eviscerated over 80 years of controlling high Court decisions.

Considering what is in a child’s best interest is undoubtedly important in any decision that impacts a child’s well-being. However, applying the best interest of the child standard with its associated factors, BY DEFINITION, is based on the personal and private biases of a judge. Yet, even in the very case cited as support by the appellate court, it is clear that the U.S. Supreme Court considers application of these biases as violations of constitutional protections:

“The question… is whether the reality of private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for removal of [a] …child from the custody of its natural [parent]. We have little difficulty concluding that they are not. The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.” (Footnote omitted.) Palmore v. Sidoti, at 433.

Though Troxel v. Granville was a case involving the wishes of grandparents against the fundamental rights of parents, the U.S. Supreme Court was crystal clear in its broad statement that “so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children. ” Id., at 67. Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court spoke broadly that “[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Id., at 66. They also broadly reaffirmed their decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Troxel v. Granville, at 66. Discussing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), they again continued with their broad confirmation “that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Troxel v. Granville, at 66. Nowhere did they state or imply that those decisions were only relevant within the context of third-party visitation. If anything, as they continued on with a plethora of other high Court decisions, they forcefully implied that these decisions, starting “[m]ore than 75 years ago,” applied in all situations. Troxel v. Granville, at 66. The U.S. Supreme Court even broadly referred to the “decisional framework employed by the Superior Court directly contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child.” Id., at 69.

In fact, they ended their high-powered introduction with the broadest of generalizations: “In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” Id., at 66. They then even summed it up once more in the broadest of terms: “[a]s we have explained, the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a "better" decision could be made.” Id., at 72. Not once in any of their ruling did the U.S. Supreme Court imply that the application of these decisions should be applied only to the matter at hand. Contrarily, they made clear just the opposite.

The U.S. Supreme Court twice clearly characterized Troxel v. Granville as “nothing more than a simple disagreement between the Washington Superior Court and Granville concerning her children's best interests.” Id., at 67. Yet, the First District disregarded Brian’s assertion that cases like Troxel v. Granville and its Illinois counterpart Wickham v. Byrne, 199 Ill.2d 309 (2002) are the appropriate precedent, claiming that these decisions “do not apply to custody proceedings under the IMDMA” because they “addressed statutes that permitted third persons to petition for child visitation.” (A5)

However, adding insult to the enormous injury already inflicted on Brian and his daughter, to counter what it considers “third person” precedent like Troxel v. Granville, the appellate court used In re A.W.J. which, again, discusses which “nonparents” (i.e., grandparents) get custody of a child after the father killed the mother and the father later dies. Again, In re A.W.J. clearly indicates that “the parental interests sought to be protected… are no longer at issue in this case because [the father] has died.” Id., at para. 21. Brian asserts that the only reason the appellate court believes it can get away with this in-your-face, contradictory, hypocritical, and dishonest behavior is specifically because it believes this Court does not have the courage to touch the political hot potato. The First Circuit, therefore, has no problem openly brandishing the contradiction. After all, who is going to care that their defense to “fit” parents/“third person” precedent like Troxel v. Granville is an unpublished case about:

“…a minor whose father killed his mother. While A.W.J.'s father was in pretrial custody, A.W.J.'s maternal grandmother filed a custody petition in the circuit court of Du Page County pursuant to section 601(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/601(b) (West 1996)). The petition was opposed by the paternal grandparents. The trial court granted custody to the maternal grandmother in a final order which contained Rule 304(a) language. The paternal grandparents appealed, and the appellate court affirmed (316 Ill. App. 3d 91). The father died while the appeal was pending. We granted leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). The sole question on which the paternal grandparents sought leave to appeal is whether the maternal grandmother had standing to bring the petition.” In re A.W.J., at para. 9.

Every U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with fit parents, children, and the best interest of the child standard flies in the face of the First District’s entire “analysis” (to cite just a few, see e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, at 651; Santosky v. Kramer, at 753; Griswold v. Connecticut, at 495-496; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655-656 (1979); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Prince v. Massachusetts, at 166.)

III. The lower court’s avoidance of critical facts and ignorance of relevant precedent screams of flagrant judicial bias and, thus, warrants review.

The First District ignored crystal clear and undisputed facts (other than the ones like “Laurie alleged…” or “Laurie specifically stated…”), sometimes while simultaneously ignoring on-point Illinois appellate cases. For example, in denying that Brian’s procedural due process was infringed from the injunction on his speech with his daughter, the First District claimed that this Court “has explained that the requirement of due process is met by… an opportunity to be heard and to enforce and protect his rights” (A7), while it completely disregarded that “Brian was significantly curtailed and later completely cut-off in presenting his defense and argument.” (A69). As it claimed that “[t]he record shows that the trial court conducted a hearing in which both parties presented testimony and closing arguments” and that “Brian did not request a continuance or object to the hearing” (A7-8), the First District ignored that the circuit court: (1) told Brian not to object and interrupt, and refused to rule on Brian’s first objection (S.R. Vol. 2: 145 lines 7-13); (2) told Brian that he could not present his facts (S.R. Vol. 2: 145 lines 19-22); (3) appeared to ignore Brian as he was speaking, so blatantly that it prompted his question to the circuit court as to whether it was even listening (S.R. Vol. 2: 147 line 22, 148 lines 1-3); (4) gave Brian a one-minute warning that it was going to cut his argument off, after what had likely been only about two minutes into Brian’s argument (S.R. Vol. 2: 150 line 22, 151 lines 1-4); (5) counted down the number of seconds Brian had to present his argument, after Brian stated he had a number of other things to present to the court (S.R. Vol. 2: 151 lines 1-11); (6) refused to respond to or rule on Brian’s second objection (S.R. Vol. 2: 151 lines 5-11); (7) refused to allow Brian to present his complete argument (S.R. Vol. 2: 151 lines 1-20); (8) refused to allow Brian to speak (S.R. Vol. 2: 152 lines 21-22, 153 lines 1-3).

In addition, and to reinforce its arbitrary use of unpublished opinions (cf. its use of unpublished In re A.W.J.), the First District disregarded its own Illinois appellate unpublished opinion Felzak v. Hruby, No. 2-05-0848, (Ill.App. Dist.2 07/28/2006), issued not even four months earlier, that was directly on-point for ruling as unconstitutional a court order limiting the communication that a parent has with his children regarding visitation and a court case:

“In this case, the trial court usurped defendants' power, as parents, to decide whether to discuss the outcome of the case with their daughter. The topics of conversation barred by the trial court involved both Katie's visitation with her grandmother and her parents' imprisonment, both of which concern her care and upbringing. As a result, we conclude that the court's order forbidding such discussion interfered with defendants' parental liberty interests as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Such an intrusion will be justified only when the state has a compelling interest. (Citations omitted.)”Id., at para. 73.

Instead, the appellate court relied on non-Illinois cases, not one of which addressed Brian’s Fourteenth Amendment challenge. [4] Ignorantly (and more likely untruthfully), the First District claimed that “ Illinois courts have apparently not yet addressed the issue.” (A8) Addressing the unconstitutional content-based restrictions of the distribution of video games in Illinois, even the 7th Circuit’s recent, high-profile case addressed the subject:

“If controlling access to allegedly “dangerous” speech is important in promoting the positive psychological development of children, in our society that role is properly accorded to parents and families, not the State.” E.S.A. v. Illinois, case no. 05 C 4265 (12/02/2005).

IV. The out-of-control perjury and the lower courts’ blatant disregard of the criminal act demands this Court’s swift and righteous action.

Laurie’s attorney stated in her closing argument: “Nobody knows the truth…” (S.R. Vol. 11: 73 line 19). The Illinois perjury statute (720 ILCS 5/32-2), Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137, and 735 ILCS 5/1-109 suggest that finding the truth is critical. Brian could not have made it any easier for anyone without any knowledge of the case to understand and find the truth. He presented 18 uncontested statements from the record (A73-78) and showed in an easy-to-read chart how these 18 statements directly contradicted each other in 70 separate instances. In response, the First District cowered behind its unsubstantiated assertion that “Brian has failed to make any showing that Laurie and her attorneys made false representations.” (A10)

Taking the lead from the appellate courts’ past blindness to perjury, all through the trial, the trial judge did her best to keep facts out of the record that suggested perjury (e.g., see A72). The obvious reason that the lower courts spew this nonsense latent with a self-inflicted blindness is because they know they can get away with it – no Illinois Supreme Court Justice is taking any action to put an end to this abhorrent and illegal behavior. The only way to ever stop the hotbed of corruption in the divorce and appellate courts is to reprimand the perpetrators. Otherwise, the courts deserve the reproach they receive as instigators of the fraud. This Court has a clear moral and legal responsibility to end this deceit, and review of this case presents an easy opportunity to deal with minimal crystal clear facts that lead to massive self-evident contradictions. Avoiding it sends a clear message to the lower courts – let the fraud continue, as we don’t care.

Conclusion

You make a mockery of the legal system when you suspend and/or deny fundamental human rights without just cause. Criminal standards are the only appropriate standards. In the novel Atlas Shrugged, Judge Narragansett’s resolve is to be the “guardian of justice;” but he quits being a judge when he is asked to use force to violate the rights of unarmed men… those who came to him seeking his protection. He quit “because [he] could not have borne to hear the words 'Your Honor' address[ed] to [him] by an honest man.” With that in mind, Brian respectfully requests that the Court grant his Petition for Leave to Appeal.

Appendix

Page

First District Order (November 21, 2006) ................................................................. A1

Petitioner-Appellant’s Brief (excluding Appendix) ..................................................... A17

Petitioner-Appellant’s Supplemental Brief (excluding Appendix) .............................. A91

Petitioner-Appellant’s Reply Brief ............................................................................ A114

[1] Citations to the appendix are noted as A__. Citations to the appellate court record are noted as R. __ (Record) and S.R. __ (Supplemental Record).

[2] Brian’s available legal research tools do not identify page numbers for all cases. Where the page number is unavailable for the exact citation, Brian uses “para.” instead to indicate the paragraph of the decision referenced.

[3] Brian contends that the Discovery Rules are not unconstitutional on their face, but only as applied in divorce proceedings.

[4] This should, in no way, suggest that the First Amendment challenge is not correct. “[I]t is nevertheless appropriate to recall how firmly embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence is the proposition that the several States have no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms protected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of the United States.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1985).