Love Is Earned

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

BRIAN LOVETT, Petitioner,

and

LAURIE LOVETT, Respondent

Case No. 00 D 06725

Summary of Constitutional Arguments

Brian Lovett (hereinafter "Brian"), Pro Se, hereby submits his Summary of Constitutional Arguments, as per the Court's request, to direct the Court to the most relevant cases in support of his position outlined in Brian's previously filed Trial Brief and testimony.

1. Upon further study and research, Brian has discovered that the unequal allocation of parental Rights and responsibilities, the imposition of unequal burdens on spouses, the transfer of property from one party to another without a showing of harm, the requirements to divulge private information and papers without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and the consequential material infringement of Brian's fundamental Rights, are impermissible under the strict standards of protection afforded litigants when such fundamental Rights are at stake.

2. Brian challenges the constitutionality of all Illinois statutes that refer to the "best interest of the child" (e.g., 750 ILCS 5/602, 603, 604, 607, 609, 610, 503 (g), and 506, as well as any other sections and rules that refer to "best interest of the child") (hereinafter "Best Interest of the Child Statutes"), on their face and as applied, which compel the State's judiciary to make "awards" of child custody and parenting time, or allocation of parental responsibilities, privileges, and parenting time, or assignment of "guardians" and "evaluators," within the context of dissolution of marriage actions and post-decree dissolution of marriage actions concerning children.  Brian contends that the challenged statutes and rules violate well-recognized FUNDAMENTAL Rights, including the Right to due process of law, the Right to equal protection of the law, the Right to privacy, and the Right to the care, custody, control, companionship, and nurture of one's offspring embodied in the fundamental liberty interest in family, which Rights are secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.  Brian is seeking that the challenged "best interest" statutes and rules are declared unconstitutional.

3. Additionally, the so-called "child support" statutes (750 ILCS 5/505, and associated sections 501 (a), 507, 510 (a), 510 (e), 510 (f), and 513, as well as any other sections and rules that refer to "child support") (hereinafter "Child Support Statutes"), the maintenance statutes (750 ILCS 5/504, and associated sections 501 (a), 507, and 510 (a), as well as any other sections and rules that refer to "maintenance") (hereinafter "Maintenance Statutes"), and the attorneys' fee statutes (750 ILCS 5/501 (c)(1), 503 (j), and 508, as well as any other sections within 750 ILCS 5 and rules that refer to "attorneys' fees") (hereinafter "Attorneys' Fees Statutes"), as well as parts 13.3.1 and 13.3.2 of the Rules of the Circuit Court of Cook County (hereinafter "Mandatory Disclosure Rules") and Illinois Supreme Court Rules 201 through 214 (hereinafter "Discovery Rules"), are directly and egregiously violative of the Federal Constitution and Illinois Constitution.  Specifically, Brian contends that the statutes and rules are unconstitutional on their face[2] and as applied because they violate the FUNDAMENTAL Rights to equal protection, to due process, to privacy, to property, and to proscriptions about involuntary servitude, all of which are guaranteed to Brian under the Federal Constitution.  Further, the statutes are unconstitutional as threatened to be applied to Brian because they violate the Rights to not be imprisoned for debt and for proscriptions about private takings for private use or public use, all guaranteed to Brian under the Illinois Constitution.

4. Brian is seeking that all of these challenged statutes and rules are declared unconstitutional.

I. JUDICIAL NOTICE

5. All officers of the Court are hereby placed on notice that non-attorney litigants are held to less stringent standards than bar licensed attorneys, and may not be "punished" (e.g., made to pay another party's attorneys' fees) for exercising fundamental Rights.  Fundamental Rights do not hang by a tenuous thread of a layman's knowledge of the niceties of law.  It is sufficient if it appears that he is attempting to assert his Rights, protected by the Federal Constitution.  The plea, rather than the form in which it is asserted, is the substance of which the Court must respect and address.  Haines v. Kerner, 404 US 519 (1972); United States v. Goodwin, 457 US 368 (1982).

6. Additionally, all litigants have a constitutionally-secured Right to have their claims adjudicated according to the rule of precedent and, by the Supremacy Clause, the Federal Constitution and US Supreme Court decisions take precedence over State court decisions.  Anastasoff v. United States, No. 99-3917EM (8th Cir. 08/22/2000).

7. When government legislates or acts either on the basis of a "suspect" classification, or when a state "law" or rule affects FUNDAMENTAL Rights, as it so clearly does in all of the challenged statutes, the traditional standard of appellate review is abandoned, there is NO presumption of constitutionality, and the Court is REQUIRED to apply "strict scrutiny" - NOT the rational relation test.  There must exist a compelling state interest before the State can impair fundamental Rights, even in the face of apparent statutory empowerment to the contrary, as evidenced by the fact that the standard of review of such a decision is one of strict scrutiny.  The Court may NOT use intermediate scrutiny (e.g., narrowly tailored to address a specific or critical state interest) because it is not the heightened scrutiny required when fundamental interests are implicated.  Any attempt by the Court to use anything less than strict scrutiny would clearly indicate that the Court completely avoided or ignored the fact that such fundamental interests are involved.  Coles v. Ryan, 91 Ill. App.3d 382 (1980); Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455 (2000); Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57 (2000).

a.   In fact, statutes and rulings which encroach on fundamental Rights are presumptively unconstitutional.  Harris v. McRae, 448 US 297 (1980).  Therefore, as ALL challenged statutes encroach on fundamental Rights, they are presumptively unconstitutional.  It is an established principle in American Jurisprudence that unconstitutional statutes are not laws.  Chicago v. Hackett, 228 US 559 (1913).

"The general misconception is that any statute passed by legislators bearing the appearance of law constitutes the law of the land.  The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and any statue, to be valid, must be in agreement.  It is impossible for both the Constitution and a law violating it to be valid; one must prevail.  This is succinctly stated as follows: The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment, and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it.  An unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as inoperative as if it had never been passed.  Such a statute leaves the question that it purports to settle just as it would be had the statute not been enacted."

"Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principals follow that it imposes no duties, confers no rights, creates no office, bestows no power or authority on anyone, affords no protection, and justifies no acts performed under it....  A void act cannot be legally consistent with a valid one.  An unconstitutional law cannot operate to supersede any existing valid law.  Indeed, insofar as a statute runs counter to the fundamental law of the land, it superseded thereby.  No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it."

Volume 16, American Jurisprudence 2d, Section 256, page 177 (1979).

II. PRIVATE PAPERS

A Rule With the Force and Effect of "Law" That Requires Divulging Information About Oneself Is Facially Unconstitutional

8. Brian provided to Laurie Lovett (hereinafter "Laurie") various private papers/documents belonging to Brian exclusively (e.g., financial documents and records, Asset Disclosure Statement, wage documents and records) (hereinafter "Private Papers"), pursuant to the purported authority of the Discovery Rules and the Mandatory Disclosure Rules which compelled Brian to produce them.  Brian objects to any and all of these Private Papers being offered into evidence that he was compelled to produce, as they were a compulsory production of a private party's books and papers to be used against him.

9. No compelling reason exists for Brian to be required to turnover his Private Papers as part of a divorce proceeding.  The State is purely using the implicated rules as a "fishing expedition" to circumvent Brian's Rights.  The Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which applies to both criminal and civil trials, specifically bars the use of compelled testimony against individuals.  In addition, verification of the Asset Disclosure Statement (i.e., the "13.3") requires that individuals produce their personal books and records (or be held in contempt), which violates the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.  The requirements to submit all the personal and financial data requested in divorce proceedings also violate an individual's Right to privacy under the Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.  Brian has a Right "not to have his private affairs made public by the government," as well as a Right "to be free in action, thought, experience, and belief from governmental compulsion."  Whalen v. Roe, 429 US 589 (1977).

a.   Cook County Circuit Court Rule 13.3.1 (c) specifically states:  "Failure of a party to timely serve the "Disclosure Statement" shall subject the non-complying party to such sanctions as the court deems appropriate, including all sanctions available under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219."  Therefore, Brian is obviously threatened with sanctions if he refuses to comply under the protection of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Federal Constitution.  Brian is required, per the implicated rules, to submit these Private Papers to the Court and/or Laurie.  Brian was therefore forced to divulge this information against his will.  As Brian was required by "law" to turnover all of the Private Papers and therefore compelled, they may not be used against Brian in any way.  If any of these Private Papers are used to present evidence that "justifies" Brian's ability to pay Laurie child support, maintenance, and/or attorneys' fees, these Private Papers are OBVIOUSLY being used against Brian to extort his property.  Furthermore, without the use of these Private Papers, the Court lacks any evidence (as the "law" requires) to extort Brian's property and give it to Laurie.  Thus again, it is OBVIOUS that these Private Papers will be used against Brian to take his property.

b.   At no time was Brian told that he had the right to remain silent, that if he gave up the right to remain silent, that the Private Papers could be used against him and his property.  Therefore, these Private Papers may not be admitted into evidence, or used against him, or used to take his property, as Brian was not given "free choice" to divulge the Private Papers.  These Private Papers are a "material ingredient" in Laurie's and the State's continued pursuit to extort Brian's property.  The government, Laurie, and his daughter are NOT "entitled" to possession of Brian's property as a result of this divorce proceeding.  Brian is innocent, but is "confounded with the guilty" when he was forced to turnover these Private Papers against his will.

10. Any Court order or rule that requires the production of personal books and records without probable cause of something ILLEGAL, supported by oath or affirmation under penalties of perjury, is facially unconstitutional.  The Court has no authority or jurisdiction to compel Brian to produce these Private Papers.  Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 (1886); Hale v. Henkel, 201 US 43 (1906).  The Fifth Amendment applies to civil cases in addition to criminal cases.  McCarthy v Arndstein, 266 US 34 (1924); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).  There can be no question that a setting in which Brian can lose (and has already lost) his Rights to his daughter and his property without criminal conviction constitutes a "setting[ ] in which [his] freedom of action is curtailed in [a] significant way."  As only a few examples indicate, Brian already has been deprived of his Right to choose the education he wants for his daughter, the Right to spend time with her on his scheduled days, and the Right to his property (e.g., purported child support, maintenance), not to mention his Rights to due process, equal protection, and privacy, ALL taken without ANY criminal conviction or accusation.  Also, the Court has extorted over $57,000 of Brian's personal property to give to Laurie's attorneys.

III. CUSTODY

Brian Is a Fit Parent, and No Evidence Exists of Abuse or Risk of Substantial Harm from Brian

11. To avoid state impairment of parental Rights, one need only be a "fit" parent.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57 (2000).  The criterion for "fitness" does not require that a parent conform to some arbitrary, state-imposed definition or a set of characteristics for personality, wealth, gender, temperament, or other individual trait, but only that one "adequately cares for his or her children." As long as one is fit in this regard, one is entitled to the full constitutional protection of one's liberty interest in family.  Brian has not been shown to be an unfit parent and therefore the Court has no reason to inject itself into the realm of his relationship with his daughter.  Any decision by the Court to force itself into the private realm of Brian's relationship with his daughter and/or deprive him of his Rights to his child would be a flagrant violation of his full constitutional protection of his liberty interest in family.  Jarrett v. Jarrett, 348 Ill. App. 1 (1952); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972).

a.   The triggering mechanism of a divorce, of and by itself, is not a sufficient-enough reason to require the State to impermissibly intervene and interrupt the associative Right of the child and parent in the parent-child relationship.  The State cannot support the argument that a child is in imminent harm just because the parents are divorcing, for alleged parental conflict may or may not rise to a level compelling State intervention.  And where such imminent level of harm does not occur in the vast majority of custody divorces, the State cannot impermissibly intervene in the private realm of the parent-child relationship.  Where a parent is fit, the legal presumption implies that the child is not in imminent harm.  Where the child is not in imminent harm, there are no competing interests to a parent's Right to the care, custody, and companionship of the child.  Where there are no competing interests, the child's best interests are already protected.  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 US 745 (1982); B.F. Hawk v. Robert S. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).

b.   Moreover, the fundamental Right of a parent to raise his or her own child has never been premised on any kind of expertise.  The Right to raise one's own child as one sees fit is no more subject to any expert opinion about a child's "best interest" than is the Right to freedom of religion subject to precisely analogous "expert" opinions about consistent theology.  Citizens have the Right to raise their children; citizens have the Right to freedom of religion - in both cases the opinions of "experts" about how well citizens exercise those Rights have no bearing upon whether citizens actually possess those Rights.  To say otherwise is reductio ad absurdum, since Rights that are subject to such "expert" opinions are not Rights at all.  "Rights," in fact, are inherent in the individual and flow out of the constitutionally recognized endowment of "Nature and Nature's God" and are not subject to the "expert" opinions of mental health professionals and/or legal professionals.  This is critically important in light of the obvious inability of mental health "experts" to achieve consensus on any notions of "best interest of the child" other than protection from abuse or criminal neglect.

i.   Therefore, the State cannot assign a Guardian Ad Litem (hereinafter "GAL") to protect the "best interest" of the child, as fit parents are already, by definition, protecting the child's best interest.  Thus, the State may not interfere.  Further, the State may not infringe on a fit parent's Right to property and require him to fund an officer of the Court (GAL) with his private property against his will.

ii.   The State also cannot require a custody evaluation to "evaluate" or identify the physical or mental state of the parties, or identify the "best interest of the child," as fit parents are already, by definition, protecting the child's best interest.  Thus, the State may not interfere.  Further, the State may not infringe on a fit parent's Right to privacy and property by forcing him to subject himself to a custody evaluation/psychological review, reveal information to a stranger, and then fund the process with his private property, all against his will.

12. The entire concept of "awarding custody" is flawed; no one is awarded Rights, but, rather, one parent is deprived of Rights (or, in the case of temporary "custody," one parent's Rights are suspended/temporarily revoked).

Brian Has a Right to Privacy and a Right to Be an Equal Parent, Both Secured By the Constitution

13. A statutory grant of jurisdiction is trumped if a parent objects and cites constitutional protections.  This blocks a court from hearing any petitions regarding a child, except only in those petitions where there are allegations that the child is abused or neglected, or is in substantial harm for another reason.  Roth v. Weston 789 A.2d 431 (Conn.2002).

14. As there is no abuse or risk of substantial harm, and as it is a parent's Right to manage a child, and as this Right is a fundamental Right protected by the Constitution, the Court does not have the authority or jurisdiction to force/inject itself into Brian's private life and "force the breakup of a natural family," under the guise of the best interest of the child.  Further, the "Due Process Clause [is] offended" if the Court does.  Therefore, the Best Interest of the Child Statutes cannot be applied.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 US 246 (1978); In re Strome, 185 Or.App. 525 (Or. 2003).

15. Brian contends that any unequal allocation of parenting time, parental responsibilities, and Rights by the Court will constitute an unconstitutional infringement of his fundamental liberty interest in his family, and his Rights under the Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.  SUBSTANTIVE due process can be defined by one word - fairness.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 US 702 (1997).

16. Brian stands in the same relation to his daughter during these proceedings as he did before these proceedings, as a divorced parent is still the parent (which was confirmed by this Court on the first day of trial).  This relationship is independent of any other relationship that exists with any other person.  A pending divorce does not nullify or reduce the relationship between Brian and his daughter.  The parties' divorce, even though it includes a child, does not give the Court a special circumstance to usurp Brian's parental authority and constitutional Rights.  Any decision by the Court that favors one parent over the other or interferes with Brian's privacy will eventually destroy an intact relationship.  The Court has a responsibility/mandate to protect constitutional Rights.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 US 745 (1982).

a.   When the parties were not getting divorced, the Court did not have the authority or jurisdiction to infringe or restrict one parent's fundamental Rights by forcing either parent to accept an unequal parenting/custody schedule.  The US Supreme Court implied that "a (once) married father who is separated or divorced from a mother and is no longer living with his child" could not constitutionally be treated differently from a currently married father living with his child.  Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 US 246 (1978).

The Best Interest of the Child Statutes Are Unconstitutional and Infringe on Brian's Constitutional Right to Rear His Child

17. Brian accepts that dissolution of his marriage would of necessity act to diminish the amount of time spent with his child, but contends that the State's power to arbitrary apply the statutory factors set forth specifically in 750 ILCS 5/602 or broadly in the 750 ILCS 5, Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, in light of the fact that no credible evidence exists herein to implicate Brian as an unfit parent, or that no "clear and present danger" exists, would result in a capricious "custody" decision which flagrantly violates Brian's Right to equal protection by "awarding" him unequal parenting time and parental responsibilities as compared with Laurie.  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US 158 (1944); Parham v. J.R., 442 US 584 (1979).

18. The welfare of citizens, including children, is an important State interest.  The State has exclusive jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the welfare of its citizens.  However, the State CANNOT impinge upon the protected and underlying federal Rights of its citizens - adults OR children.  State privileges (i.e., statutory entitlements) DO NOT supercede substantive federal Rights.  The State has reversed the "pecking order" of the Supremacy Clause.  The best interest standard cannot supercede parental and children's Rights; yet the State places the "best interest of the child" at the top of the pyramid, disregarding federal Rights to "custody."  The Federal Constitution permits a State to interfere with this Right only to prevent harm or potential harm to the child.  There is no public purpose that demands the harm and social damage to the fundamental parent-child relationship where the child is implicitly protected by a fit parent.  The Best Interest of the Child Statutes do not require a threshold showing of harm and sweep too broadly by permitting a court to exercise virtually infinite discretion in "allocating" parental Rights and responsibilities, parenting time and "awards" of custody, "guardians" and "evaluators," with the only requirement being that the judicial outcomes be "found" - solely by the court whom has no "special wisdom" - to serve the "best interest of the child," which is in fact determined by the court itself.  Yet, the "best interest" standard "provides little real guidance...[and] is fundamentally at odds with privacy interests."  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 US 622 (1979).

a.   Lacking a requirement that a child is, or ever was proven to be, in substantial harm, the Best Interest of the Child Statutes are facially unconstitutional.  Frequently, the legal community uses the term "best interest of the child" to gloss over constitutional mandates.  "Best interest" is actually a legal standard placing the trial judge, and hence the State, superior to fit parents.  Its only proper use is after parental Rights are terminated or after a threshold showing of harm.  Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 US 246 (1978); Roth v. Weston 789 A.2d 431 (Conn.2002).  Courts can reasonably claim to know that the "best interests of children" means protecting children against abuse and/or criminal negligence.  They cannot reasonably claim to know more.  Thus, in all cases in which court decisions implement disproportionate custody schedules and privileges as between fit parents, those decisions are per se capricious and unconstitutionally violative of liberty interests, except in those in which a parent has been legally found to be abusive or criminally negligent of his or her children.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 US 622 (1979).

b.   The Best Interest of the Child Statutes unnecessarily create two classes of parents (i.e., custodial and non-custodial) out of essentially similarly situated persons, thus committing an equal protection under-inclusive violation (i.e., treats persons with the same capabilities differently).  Additionally, the Best Interest of the Child Statutes automatically place fit parents in the same group as unfit ones and subject them all to the best interest of the child legal standard, thus causing an equal protection over-inclusive violation (i.e., treats persons with different capabilities the same, and sweeps in more than it should).  No contested divorce with children in Illinois can achieve a constitutional resolution under federal law where both parents' Rights are implicated, for the non-custodial parent's Rights are always denied, and the custodial parents are always enlarged without an evidentiary standard other than the discretion (i.e., best interests) of the trial court.

i.   Additionally, and upon information and belief, Brian contends that the Best Interest of the Child Statutes are biased and discriminatory against men/fathers, in that mothers consistently and overwhelmingly receive preferential treatment in Illinois custody "awards" (i.e., mothers receive custody 75% of the time, whereas fathers receive custody 7% of the time, and joint custody is declared 14% of the time).

19. A statute, in and of itself, cannot trump the Constitution.  In this case, the so-called Best Interest of the Child Statutes are routinely utilized by the Court to effectively limit or reduce parental Rights (i.e., personal liberties), by assigning custody when there is absolutely no finding that the parent is unfit.  Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455 (2000); Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 68 Ill.2d 419 (1977).  Further, a statute, by its mere existence "on the books," cannot overcome fundamental individual Rights such as one's liberty interest in his family relations.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57 (2000).

a.   A statute that allows a judge to exercise "too much discretion in every case" or "unlimited discretion" is unconstitutional because it undermines the parent's fundamental Right to make decisions regarding the care and custody of the child (i.e., because the parent's decision is no longer presumed to be in the child's best interest).  City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 US 41 (1999).  The Best Interest of the Child Statutes attempt to allow the Court broad discretion to take over a child's life like a thief and usurp parental Rights.  It is a statutory flaw when a statute "...places the best-interest determination solely in the hands of the judge."  Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57 (2000).

b.   The issue here is not who achieves/receives "custody."  The issue is that, under Illinois law, a parent can be deprived of their parental Right to custody or responsibility of their child, temporarily or permanently, based solely on the whim of the Court, absent of proven criminal violent acts.  By definition, any statute that limits the decision-making capability (i.e., fundamental Right) of a fit parent is, on its face, unconstitutional because "no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid."  Wickham v. Byrne, 199 Ill.2d 309 (2002).

c.   In addition, a statute will be held unconstitutional if it is "breathtakingly broad."  Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57 (2000).  Section 602 and related statutes that refer to the "best interest of the child" create an intolerable tension in the law because they allow the Court extremely broad latitude to make ANY custody decision, and almost ANY decision for that matter (e.g., which school a child should attend against a parent's wishes), based on its own discretion, even if Brian adequately cares for his daughter, and without any showing that Brian is an unfit parent.

20. The Best Interest of the Child Statutes create significant interference on Brian's fundamental Rights and implicates his daughter's welfare.  Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455 (2000).  Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court recently reiterated this opinion in its appellate review striking down 607(b)(1) and reinforced that state interference with fundamental childrearing Rights is extremely limited, giving specific examples of where State interference is permitted.  Wickham v. Byrne, 199 Ill.2d 309 (2002).

21. It is well-established and settled law that family relations comprise a protected liberty interest, possibly one of the oldest of these interests.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 US 745 (1982).  Brian's liberty interest of family relations is to be accorded the greatest respect, and is a protected interest.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 US 246 (1978).

IV. CHILD SUPPORT, MAINTENANCE, AND ATTORNEYS' FEES

The Child Support Statutes, Maintenance Statutes, and Attorneys' Fees Statutes Violate Brian's Right to Equal Protection Under the Law

22. The Court has no authority or jurisdiction to "award" child support, maintenance, or attorneys' fees, as the Child Support Statutes, the Maintenance Statutes, and the Attorneys' Fees Statutes (hereinafter "Wealth Transfer Statutes") violate Brian's Right to equal protection of the laws, a Right guaranteed by the Federal and Illinois Constitutions, in that the statutes subject Brian to burdens different from, and in excess of, those imposed on persons (parents or otherwise) in an intact marriage and/or non-related persons.  While the legal relation between a husband and wife is altered by the entry of a decree of dissolution of marriage, the legal relation between each parent individually and the child is not so altered.  A parent stands in the same relation to his or her child after dissolution as he or she did prior to dissolution.  Similarly, the ex-spouses stand in exactly the same relation to each other (i.e., as non-related persons) and therefore cannot be treated differently.

a.   A divorced, higher earning or more "financially able" ex-spouse is "singled out" and treated by the State very differently than the way the State treats a divorced, lower earning or "financially deprived" ex-spouse.  The State requires them to pay child support, maintenance, and/or attorneys' fees to the other party, while it gives them no like or corresponding benefit.  Only against divorcing spouses is such extraction made (e.g., the State does not single out other financially able non-related persons or married parents), and only in certain cases.  Therefore, a claim that all divorced parents are treated alike is not to draw a valid distinction.  The implicated statutes are simply "imposing a penalty" upon a divorcing spouse for being a more financially able spouse.  No one else is "punished."  Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Company v. Ellis, 165 US 150 (1897).

i.   In this 1897 decision, the US Supreme Court stated CLEARLY that "men possessed of a certain wealth" (i.e., "financially advantaged" using the Court's current language) CANNOT be subjected to paying attorneys' fees for the reason of being "financially advantaged."  It is a "punishment."  It is not a proper basis for the attempted classification.  It is an INCENTIVE to litigate.  This is as clear as language can make it.

23. The Wealth Transfer Statutes violate Brian's Right to equal protection of the laws in that he suffers egregiously different burdens (without benefits) from Laurie who is similarly situated with respect to each other and/or their child (i.e., they are both in "identically the same situation"), as a divorce imposes on Brian a sum certain to be expended for his child and/or a (soon-to-be) non-related person.Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company v. NYE Schneider Fowler Company, 260 US 35 (1922).  The Wealth Transfer Statutes do not treat all (soon-to-be) divorced ex-spouses and/or parents alike, as they discriminate between higher and lower wage earners, higher and lower asset holders, and custodial and non-custodial parents.  However, even if the statutes treat all (soon-to-be) divorced persons alike, this is not the claim being urged here.  This distinction, created by operation of the statutes, is one of the core elements of the laws being challenged.  The Rights at issue are of the most fundamental nature (e.g., the Right to property).  A (soon-to-be) divorced ex-spouse (i.e., non-related person) is treated by the State very differently than the way the State treats other non-related persons.  A (soon-to-be) divorced parent is treated by the State very differently than the way the State treats other married parents.  Similarly, a divorced, higher-earning ex-spouse, with or without more non-marital property, is treated by the State very differently than the way the State treats a lower-earning divorced ex-spouse, with or without less non-marital property.  Regardless of the custody of the child, and regardless of one ex-spouse's/parent's income relative to the other's, and regardless of the amount of time a parent is "allowed" to spend with the child, a divorced ex-spouse/parent is NOT situated differently with respect to the other and/or his/her child. Again, the claim that all divorced persons/parents are treated alike is not to draw a valid distinction.  The Wealth Transfer Statutes, while facially content-neutral and generally applicable, are neither, in that they regularly and routinely result in unequal treatment of similarly situated persons.  The statutes are not supported by nor narrowly tailored to serve a valid governmental interest, as their application inevitably results in imposition of an order against one divorced ex-spouse (i.e., non-related person)/parent to pay an arbitrary sum certain to the other when the State cannot and does not impose such a burden on a married parent or non-related person situated identically in relation to another parent or non-related person.  Discriminatory intent is clear as, by the statutes' very terms, the Court can order only one party (e.g., the higher earning party, the party with greater assets) to pay the other.  No rational basis justifies singling out one non-related person or parent (e.g., on the basis of financial ability) and imposing upon him/her a disproportionate financial burden while awarding the other non-related person or parent a windfall of benefits.

24. A state cannot single out a class of persons identified by traits (e.g., married or divorced, custodial or non-custodial, higher or lower wage earners, more or less assets, financially able or disabled), without a compelling interest such as a crime, and then deny them equal protection by imposing a burden on that class (e.g., that they must pay money to the other).  A state's actions are even more blatantly discriminatory when the imposed burden benefits a similarly situated class, as it does in the case of child support, maintenance, and attorneys' fees.  The US Supreme Court has held that a statute is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds for singling out a class of persons identified by a single trait, and then denying them protection across the board.  Romer v. Evans, 517 US 620 (1996).

a.   CHILD SUPPORT:  Section 505 specifically allows the Court to "order either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child of the marriage to pay an amount reasonable and necessary for his support..."  The section is BLATANTLY biased in that even its wording specifically allows the Court to order ONLY ONE parent (i.e., "either or both") to support a child of the marriage, when both parents are obviously financially responsible for providing, and have a duty to provide, reasonable support for the child.  Discriminatory intent is clear as, by its very terms, the Court can order only one party (e.g., the non-custodial parent, the parent that makes a higher salary, the parent who receives less time/privileges) to pay child support.  In Illinois, both parents have an obligation to support their children. No rationale justifies singling out one parent (e.g., on a basis of custody, financial resources, or parental time/privileges) and imposing upon him (and, on rare occasion, her) a disproportionate financial burden while awarding the other parent a windfall of tax-free income and other benefits.  The State has created a classification of married and divorced parents.  This is an arbitrary classification as there is no legitimate overriding purpose, and is therefore suspect.  The State has created a classification of "more financially able" and "less financially able" ex-spouses.  This is an arbitrary classification as there is no legitimate overriding purpose, and is therefore suspect.  The State cannot assume that a divorced parent, simply by dint of the marital dissolution, will fail to support his children.[3]  The State cannot, consistent with due process requirements, merely presume that unmarried parents in general and Brian in particular, are unsuitable and neglectful parents, and will therefore fail or refuse (be "unsuitable" in the parlance of Stanley v. Illinois, supra) to provide the reasonable or necessary support.  Parental unfitness must be established on the basis of individualized proof.  Bell v. Burson, 402 US 535 (1971); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972).  Any other legislative scheme creates an artificial class of parents who, by dint of marital status alone, are presumed "unfit" and in need of State coercion to discharge their obligations.  The State cannot intentionally create a condition/class (e.g., non-custodial parent) and then impose a punishment/penalty on it (e.g., child support) without a compelling interest such as a crime (e.g., negligence).

b.   MAINTENANCE:  As a "statute based upon a legislative declaration of facts is subject to constitutional attack on the ground that the facts no longer exist," the non-existence of the underlying facts of maintenance/alimony renders the Maintenance Statutes unconstitutional.  Leary v. United States, 395 US 6 (1969).  The present logic and purpose of maintenance is not clear or applicable to current conditions (i.e., the original intent and purpose no longer exist).  Historically, alimony was SPECIFICALLY designed for the wife of a broken marriage who needed financial assistance, or to compensate women for past discrimination during marriage which left them unprepared to fend for themselves in the working world following divorce.  Orr v. Orr, 440 US 268 (1979).  Alimony was important historically because employment opportunities were limited to women after marriage.  The primary "cost" of divorce for many women was the reduction in their human capital that resulted from the sacrifices made during marriage.  The cost of the divorce and the resulting "debt" was a lifestyle similar to the one enjoyed during the marriage.  Since the debt was tied to the dissolution of a marriage, it was logical for the debt to be repaid with periodic payments that could be modified and would end with remarriage or death.  Women now have significantly increased employment opportunities.  Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972 (US 05/27/2003).  Historically, alimony was somewhat more relevant when the Court could consider a party's "fault."  The laws considered fault/criminalized abuse in alimony awards (i.e., a guilty spouse had to pay an innocent spouse).  As the statute states, Illinois no longer considers fault in a determination of maintenance.

i.   As sex was removed, it is no longer known what the legislature is trying to accomplish by awarding spousal maintenance.  Appellate courts have modified their decisions over the years in a flawed attempt to justify the continued legislative action, initially intended to support women, which no longer serves the initial intent as sex was removed from the statute.  The legislative intent of alimony was to support WOMEN ONLY.  In Re Fisher, 15 Ill.2d 139 (1958); Jackson v. Jackson, 34 Ill. App.3d 407 (1975); In Re Marriage of Workman, 89 Ill. App.3d 886 (1980).  The history of the courts made it CRYSTAL clear that the legislative purpose of alimony was to support a wife.  The whole structure conforms to this particular purpose.  However, after Orr v. Orr, supra, made it clear that family courts are to treat men and women equally, the State/appellate court merely removed sex from the statute AND kept using the IDENTICAL judicial decisions to support their findings, EVEN THOUGH the original intents specifically stated in those judicial decisions (i.e., support of wife and discrimination of women) were no longer applicable.  Bellow v. Bellow, 94 Ill. App.3d 361 (1981).  Evidence of legislative intent (i.e., support of wife and discrimination of women) are no longer applicable nor apply in the award of maintenance.  People v. Pullen, 192 Ill.2d 36 (2000); Consumer Product Safety Commission et al. v. GTE Sylvania, 447 US 102 (1980).  The underlying facts of the presumptions that alimony was based on no longer exist (e.g., women are no longer the only recipients of alimony, women now more fully participate in the workplace).

c.   ATTORNEYS' FEES:  "Leveling the [financial] playing field" by awarding attorneys' fees in a civil suit of two related OR non-related persons is not a legitimate government interest, to say nothing of a compelling one as it infringes on the fundamental Right to property.  Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US 12 (1956).  Contrary to what is stated in Beyer v. Parkis, the State may NOT discriminate (i.e., "limit" or "prohibit" someone's ability or fundamental Rights) for the sole reason of being in a "financially advantageous position."  EVEN if the award can later be revoked, the State may not discriminate in the first place.  The courts even admit that they and the State are discriminating against the "financially advantageous position/party."  Beyer v. Parkis, 324 Ill.App.3d 305 (2001).  "Leveling the playing field by equalizing the parties' litigation resources" for the "State's public interest in the institution of marriage, and by extension, the State's interest in ensuring the fairness and integrity of all proceedings related to dissolution" is not a legitimate government interest, much less a compelling one as to discriminate and deprive a person their fundamental Right to property.  The State may not enter the private realm of family life.  An award of attorneys' fees is a punitive award ordered by the government and directly applied to the "financially advantageous" party for the SOLE reason of being financially able WITHOUT a showing of tort, compensable injury, or damages.  Discriminatory intent is clear as, by its very terms, the Court can order only one party (e.g., the "financially advantaged" party) to pay the other.  No rational basis justifies singling out one spouse/ex-spouse/non-related person (on the basis of financial ability) and imposing upon him/her a disproportionate financial burden while awarding the other a windfall of benefits.

i.   In fact, under the statutes, Brian is prejudiced for the sole reason of personally choosing not to use an attorney (i.e., appear pro se), in that his legal fees are reduced and he therefore is assumed to have a greater financial ability to pay.  Therefore, by every sacrificial action Brian takes to reduce his own personal expenses, which is a private and "personal choice," he puts himself at greater risk of paying a larger portion of Laurie's attorneys' fees.

d.   No reasonable difference exists that one spouse/ex-spouse should have an immediate or perpetual claim on the current or future earnings/assets of the other, or that one spouse/ex-spouse should be required to meet the current/future financial needs of the other (especially after the marriage has ended).  Child support, maintenance, and attorneys' fees are nothing more than punitive awards (without any showing of fault, tort, compensable injury, or damages) of an ARBITRARY reallocation of current/future income/assets, with the burden, punishment, and harm imposed on the higher income spouse/ex-spouse or spouse/ex-spouse with more assets.  Any transfer of income/assets from the higher to the lower income/asset person during or after dissolution just because they are/were married is highly arbitrary.  In addition, this transfer can be awarded by the Court without any regard for marital conduct.  One party is therefore burdened with child support, maintenance, and/or attorneys' fees, without a corresponding privilege or benefit.  Any award is essentially a penalty and harm on the higher income/asset spouse/ex-spouse for the SOLE reason of being the higher wage/asset earner (e.g., if one spouse has surplus income, additional maintenance may be justified.  In re Marriage of Fields, 288 Ill.App.3d 1053 (1997)).  A difference in incomes/assets during or after divorce alone is not a rational basis for compensation between ex-spouses.  People have different incomes for a variety of reasons, many of which have nothing to do with their marriage (e.g., intelligence, diligence, taking riskier vs. more comfortable job options, want of personal lifestyle).  The government may not intrude on and/or compensate an individual with another's PRIVATE PROPERTY for a personal choice the individual makes that later has unexpected/unwanted ramifications and consequences.  Each individual must by responsible and accept the rewards/consequences for his/her actions.  Without significant evidence that one party's lower income/assets are the result of sacrifices made for the benefit of the family, it is highly arbitrary to impose this cost on the higher income/asset spouse/ex-spouse.[4]  Except for sacrifices made for the benefit of the family, the reason for these wage differentials between people lie outside the family.

i.   The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines arbitrary as "depending on individual discretion (as of a judge) and not fixed by law."

ii.   No State law exists that defines what standard of living, earnings capacity, or income a person (married, divorced, or otherwise) is entitled.  These outcomes are left to individual opinions and resulting decisions/actions.  The State has no, and cannot have any, legitimate interest in rewarding or penalizing these individual/personal/private opinions, decisions, and actions.  Therefore, the "relevant factors" are arbitrary.

25. Brian is not claiming that he does not owe a duty of support to his daughter, nor has he claimed that he does not wish to support his own daughter.  Brian's claim under the equal protection argument is that the State's sum certain guideline child support treats him differently from other parents similarly situated with respect to their children without a compelling state interest.

26. As per Title 45 CFR 302.55, "the State must provide that there shall be a rebuttable presumption, in any judicial or administrative proceeding for the award of child support, that the amount of the award which would result from the application of the guidelines established under paragraph (a) of this section is the correct amount of child support to be awarded."  There are no baseline components to the child support guidelines model (hereinafter "Guidelines").  It is not clear what can be rebutted, therefore they are arbitrary and also a due process violation.  Current Guidelines, according to federal regulations, should be rebutted if it is shown that the presumptive award is unjust and inappropriate.  If the case before the court does not fit with the economic assumptions underlying the Guidelines or if the economic assumptions are flawed, then such a showing rebuts the presumption.  The Guidelines do not take into account the large tax-related child cost offsets the custodial parent receives.  Not sharing the child-related tax benefit violates equal protection, in that it provides an extraordinary benefit for the custodial parent.  The Guidelines do not take into account the other parent's income.  The presumptive child support award does not vary with family income - only obligor income.  This is not rational and violates equal protection.  The Guidelines ignore which parent actually incurs the child costs.  Without examining which parent incurs what costs, an economically appropriate award cannot be determined.  Child costs of only one parent (e.g., custodial) are covered by the Guidelines.  Similar costs incurred by the other parent (e.g., non-custodial) do not receive similar consideration.  Yet, parents are similarly situated when child costs are incurred by either parent.  Each parent has an equal duty to provide financially for the children.  The Guidelines do not take into account that two households are being supported (i.e., each parent's household), that intact family standards of living cannot be maintained, and that the award is being spent in a single-parent household.  Section 505 allows the Court to consider "the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved" as a basis for its child support award.  However, a standard of living comparison is not a comparison of child costs.

The Child Support Statutes, Maintenance Statutes, and Attorneys' Fees Statutes Violate Brian's Right to Due Process

27. The Federal Constitution provides that no state may "deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."  Protection from arbitrary state action is the very essence of substantive due process.  The "substance and effect of [these] act[s] is to deprive [Brian] of [his] property."  United States v. Heinszen & Company, 206 US 370 (1907).  An individual's labor is considered his personal property, and the wages from this labor are considered property.  Therefore, Brian's labor and wages are considered and must be protected as a fundamental Right.  Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 US 746 (1884).

28. In the situation of an intact marriage, the State lacks any interest, legitimate or sufficiently compelling, to permit it to enact laws that would dictate a sum certain (i.e., reallocation of future income and/or assets) to be used for or directed to the benefit of a child, a non-related person, or a spouse.  Those decisions lie strictly within the discretion of the parents/spouses/non-related persons.[5] The Wealth Transfer Statutes violate Brian's Right to due process in that they impose a sum certain "payment" in divorced families when the State has no ability to dictate a sum certain in married families and/or non-related persons.  The State's actions under these statutes are therefore arbitrary and constitute a capricious exercise of governmental power. 

a.   Even though "awards" of child support, maintenance, and attorneys' fees are not required, these powers bestowed by the legislature on the judiciary to forcefully take the personal property of one related or non-related person and give it to another for a perceived need to "equalize economic conditions" (e.g., for the purpose of a continuation of "social obligations," to "level the playing field") are NOT legitimate or compelling state interests, regardless of whether two people are spouses or ex-spouses, related or not related, or custodial or non-custodial.  "Those are contingencies of life which are hardly within the power, let alone the duty, of a State to correct or cushion."  Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US 12 (1956).  The right to property is fundamental.  It is not enough for the Court to contend that the purposes are to address critical state interests.  The very essence of the heightened standard of review of strict scrutiny is to prevent individuals from being victimized by arbitrary action and having their fundamental interests infringed by a state.  The Fourteenth Amendment, in essence, protects a state's citizens from forced obeisance to whimsical and capricious state actions.  The Court may NOT use intermediate scrutiny, though even using intermediate scrutiny, the statutes must fail.  The statutes are not narrowly tailored to support critical state interests, as they are regularly applied to compensate a divorced ex-spouse from the other for a lost standard of living that, according to the appellate courts, she is "entitled to."  Providing a child or a divorced ex-spouse an equal standard of living (e.g., Chapman v. Chapman, 285 Ill.App.3d 377 (1996)), or compensating a divorced ex-spouse for a lost standard of living (e.g., In Re Marriage of Marie R. Courtright, 185 Ill. App. 3d 74 (1989)), or "leveling the playing field" (e.g., Beyer v. Parkis, 324 Ill.App.3d 305 (2001)) are NOT critical state interests, and the State has no authority or duty "to correct or cushion" (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US 12 (1956)) these situations, nor any other (e.g., if they lose money in the stock market, if they declare bankruptcy as a result of overspending their means)  No State law exists that defines what standard of living, financial independence, or income a person (married, divorced, or otherwise) is "entitled to."  These outcomes are left to individual opinions and resulting decisions.  The State has no, and cannot have any, legitimate interest in rewarding or penalizing these individual opinions and decisions.  Therefore, the "relevant factors" in all of the statutes are arbitrary.  Any attempt by the Court to use anything less than strict scrutiny would clearly indicate that the Court completely avoided or ignored the fact that such fundamental interests are involved (e.g., the Right to property).

29. A statute is "void for vagueness" if its prohibitions are not clearly defined, or if explicit standards are not provided for those who apply them.  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 US 104 (1972); Village of Hoffman Estates et al. v. Flip-Side, 455 US 489 (1982).  As if that were not enough proof to immediately dispose of the implicated statutes, the US Supreme Court also held that a statute is void only if it is so vague where "no standard of conduct is specified at all."  Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 US 611 (1971).  [Emphasis added].  All implicated statutes throughout this pleading specify no standard of conduct.  This is as clear as language can make it.

a.   There exists no factual basis for the amount or degree of deviation from the Guidelines, the maintenance factors, or the attorneys' fees factors, other than the Court's ARBITRARY opinion (e.g., "best interest of the child," "standard of living," "any other factor").  The Wealth Transfer Statutes are irrational and unreasonable statutes, which impose irrational and unjustifiable restrictions on the pristine exercise of protected Rights secured by the Constitution.  Because they are irrational and unreasonable, their application violates the due process clause of the Federal and Illinois Constitutions.  A broad set of factors is used in determining the amount and duration of "awards," and in the words of Mohr (for maintenance), "the trial court is not limited to the factors in the governing statute."  No rational logic exists as to why one non-related person should finance another's "needs" while a marriage is ending or after a marriage has ended.  This is true even if the factors (e.g., Guidelines in the case of child support) are subject to modification at a hearing, as a sliding scale of obligations to support a child or non-related person based on the other's income is NOT a legitimate or compelling state interest, regardless of whether the people are married or divorced, custodial or non-custodial.  Though the Court can claim that it does not "presume" a child (or, more properly, a divorced ex-spouse) needs child support, or that a divorced ex-spouse needs maintenance or attorneys' fees, and can claim that it makes its determination of financial support based on the factors/"facts," there are no relevant or rational standards that constitute what the "facts" are being compared to, except other judicial decisions that are completely based on its own arbitrary/personal opinions in the first place.  Any attempt to use such logic is purely circular reasoning and therefore not rational.  The statutes do not identify prohibited behavior or unlawful conduct (e.g., nowhere do the statutes explicitly state what "unlawful conduct" Brian must avoid in order to avoid paying child support, maintenance, and/or attorneys' fees to Laurie).  This is unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, each "enactment is void."  There exists no factual basis or reasons for the amount or degree of deviation (nor how to apply the deviations) within the factors, other than the Court's ARBITRARY opinion.  Trial courts have tremendous latitude for variation, with no review of how that latitude is being exercised and whether it is being used to achieve results that are fair or not.

i.   CHILD SUPPORT:  Additionally, for child support guidelines, the intended purpose is to establish an economically appropriate child support award, as described in 45 CFR 302.56 and is the State's intent for the Guidelines by the Supremacy Clause and related case "law."  Illinois's Guidelines do not award economically appropriate child support.  A rational relationship for the Guidelines must include a rational economic basis.  Specifically, the Guidelines must not be arbitrary.  Substantive due process guarantees are violated if the questioned statute or a part thereof is a patently arbitrary classification lacking any rational justification.  US v. Neal, 46 F. 3d 1405 (7th Cir, 1995).  The US Supreme Court has found that a presumption cannot be arbitrary; otherwise the presumption violates due process.  Manley v. Georgia, 279 US 1 (1929).  The Child Support Statutes further violate Brian's Right to due process in that they impose an arbitrary burden on Brian to "support" his daughter which bears no rational relation to the actual cost of supporting his daughter.

ii.   MAINTENANCE AND ATTORNEYS' FEES:  There are no baseline components to alimony or attorneys' fees, and the courts are not even limited to the factors listed in the statutes.  It is not clear what can be rebutted, therefore they are arbitrary.  Alimony and attorneys' fees factors do not give any guidance on how to apply the factors.  Under the statutes, "needs" are measured and defined based solely on the whim/PERSONAL OPINION of the Court, whom has "wide latitude," using criteria such as the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage, and is not even limited to the factors in the statutes (e.g., In Re Marriage of Simmons, 87 Ill. App.3d 651 (1980); In re Marriage of Harlow, 251 Ill.App.3d 152 (1993); In re Marriage of Mohr, 260 Ill.App.3d 98 (1994)).  No precise formula exists for the determination of maintenance or attorneys' fees.    No criteria or guidance exists for how much maintenance or attorneys' fees to award.  No criteria or guidance exists for how long maintenance is awarded, or whether maintenance remains after the ex-spouse remarries.  No criteria or guidance exists for how maintenance is modified, or why it can be modified.

30. In and of itself, "eliminating the hurdle of an evidentiary hearing in most [attorneys' fees] cases" (as Beyer v. Parkis, supra, puts it) is a direct violation of the Right to due process.  Procedural due process requirements must allow a party the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.  The explicit denial of an evidentiary hearing cannot be enforced through discretionary efforts.  Vitek v. Jones, 445 US 480 (1980); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972).

The Child Support Statutes, Maintenance Statutes, and Attorneys' Fees Statutes Violate Brian's Right to Privacy

31. While the source of the Right to privacy has been held to originate in varying constitutional provisions, it has been long recognized to apply to "family" concerns whether the family exists within the confines of marriage or not.  Privacy is a fundamental Right subject to review under strict scrutiny.  It is self-evident that both government restraint as well as government compulsion - as in the challenged statutes here - are subject to constitutional scrutiny. The Right of privacy was denominated by the US Supreme Court to be a liberty - and therefore subject to review under strict scrutiny - with a long history of high Court sustenance and which found its source and its protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).  Privacy as a concept appears to encompass at least two different but related aspects.  First, it relates to the Right or the ability of individuals to determine how much and what information about themselves is to be revealed to others.  Second, it relates to the idea of autonomy, the freedom of individuals to perform or not perform certain acts or subject themselves to certain experiences.  Whalen v. Roe, 429 US 589 (1977).  This second aspect is the aspect which Brian propounds here.  In a case involving private possession of pornography, the US Supreme Court enunciated the autonomy aspect of privacy, which is manifest in the instant action.  Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US 557 (1969).  If the conditions of our Federal Constitution sought to protect man's Right to his "material things," "beliefs, thoughts, and emotions" (i.e., his Right "to be let alone" from the unwarranted intrusions of government), then that protection must extend ineluctably to the self-determination of how and in what manner man shall raise his own children, and in what manner man shall spend and utilize his property (regardless of whether he is related or not related to them).

a.   CHILD SUPPORT:  The Child Support Statutes violate Brian's Right to privacy in that they require Brian to pay an amount to Laurie in excess of that required to meet his daughter's basic needs, and therefore the statutes impermissibly interfere with parental decisions regarding financial expenditures on children.  The Guidelines are an unnecessary interference by the government.  Any government mandate beyond basic child costs interferes with this Right to privacy.  The Child Support Statutes usurp from Brian his Right to self-determination in the raising and caring for his daughter, which intrusion serves no legitimate public interest, since he has never been accused or convicted of failing to reasonably and adequately care for his child.  Once the economic necessities of a child are covered, the government has no Right to say how much money should be spent for the care of children.  By requiring a parent to pay an amount in excess of that required to meet the child's basic needs, the Guidelines impermissibly interfere with parental decisions regarding financial expenditures of children.  Brian is willing and offers to pay 50% of all his daughter's MAJOR educational and health care expenses (including insurance) that the parties JOINTLY agree to.  Moreover, the statutes violate Brian's Right to privacy in that they require a sum certain in support of his daughter when there is a less intrusive law existing in Illinois which provides for felony conviction and punishment for failure "to provide for the support and maintenance of his or her child or children under the age of 18 years..."  (Statute 750 ILCS 16/15 [Failure to Support]).  The Child Support Statutes interfere with a married or divorced parent's Right to raise one's children without "unnecessary" government interference.

b.   MAINTENANCE AND ATTORNEYS' FEES:  The Maintenance Statutes and Attorneys' Fees Statutes are an unnecessary interference by the government.  Any government mandate that can force Brian to give property to Laurie on the flimsy grounds that she is "entitled" to it, she "needs" it, or to "level the playing field" interferes with his Right to privacy.  The Maintenance Statutes and Attorneys' Fees Statutes usurp from Brian his Right to self-determination in supporting himself.  The government has no right to say how Brian should spend his money, especially on someone to he will be/is no longer related.

The Child Support Statutes, Maintenance Statutes, and Attorneys' Fees Statutes Are Unconstitutional Taking of Property

32. The Child Support Statutes are unconstitutional per se and as applied in that they constitute an illegal taking in violation of the Federal (Fifth Amendment) and Illinois (Article I, section 15) Constitutions because the statutes impose an award under the Guidelines within them against Brian for the purpose of the State continuing to receive federal funds under Title 45 CFR 302.55 and related federal code.  This constitutes a taking of private property for public use without just compensation.  Sum certain Guideline child support in non-intact families falls squarely within the realm of public interest and public use.  Guideline child support was enacted by the State legislature for the public weal; therefore, it serves a putatively "public" use, for which Brian's property is legislatively confiscated to satisfy.  Sum certain Guideline child support taken from Brian would result in direct pecuniary gain to the State.  Additionally, the more the State takes from Brian, the more the State gains financially.  CFR 302.55 provides for Federal "incentive payments" to the State and its political subdivisions for "costs of carrying out the activities under the State plan . . ." to collect ordered sum certain amounts of child support.  Thus, as "authorized by statute, [ ] private property is taken for the State or under its direction for public use" by imposing and collecting sum certain child support from Brian, from which the State garners funding directly as the result.  Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company v. Chicago, 166 US 226 (1897).

33. The Wealth Transfer Statutes are unconstitutional per se and as applied in that they constitute an illegal taking in violation of Article 1, section 15, of the Illinois Constitution, which forbids eminent domain's exercise for private use.  The statutes impose an award within them against Brian for the purpose of transference to his wife, his daughter, or his wife's attorneys exclusively for her/their discretionary use. This constitutes a private taking for a private use.  The challenged statutes compel a private taking for private use (i.e., an individual, rather than the community) - without the payer's consent or just compensation to payer - in that the sum certain that would be extracted from Brian pursuant to the statutes would be transferred to his wife (or possibly, though unlikely, his daughter) with a complete vacuum of any accountability that said monies are actually expended on behalf of his daughter when she is in her care, or are expended on appropriate educational expenses.  Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C., 304 Ill.App.3d 542 (1999); Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company v. Chicago, 166 US 226 (1897).  Since Brian will no longer be married to Laurie, the transfer of assets to a stranger-at-law/non-related person constitutes the government forcing Brian to assuage and offset the obligations of Laurie, since the legislature has established and the courts have affirmed as well-settled law that each parent owes a duty of support for their children.  The respect for private property and the restraint on arbitrary government confiscation of it come to the Court with a momentum initiated at the founding of our nation.  James Madison wrote in Property:  "What a man has honestly acquired is absolutely his own, which he may freely give, but cannot be taken from him without his consent."  If Brian fails to reasonably support his daughter, he should be criminally prosecuted.  Otherwise, the State has no claim upon his income or assets.

34. The Wealth Transfer Statutes are unconstitutional per se and as applied in that they constitute an illegal seizure of property in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.  Brian's individually-earned financial compensation and rewards for past, present, and future decisions and actions not related to the marriage are his property alone.  The government is not entitled to possession of Brian's property, to allocate as it pleases.  Brian has a Right to feel secure that rewards he earns based solely on his own volition are protected from unwarranted government intrusion.  Brian is not a servant for social goods, however large and valuable the State may consider them to be; thus, the State may not "take property from A to [give to] B."  Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Riverside Mills, 219 US 186 (1911).  The Fourth Amendment, at its most fundamental level, is designed to protect people from the government.  It is therefore no great leap to suggest that it should be interpreted in a manner favorable to the enhancement of individual liberty.  Any State contention that it has proper authority of law to take Brian's earnings and give them to someone else (e.g., in its desire to maintain "social obligations" or "level the playing field") therefore directly contradicts the protection from government interference intended.

a.   In fact, the reviewing courts readily admit the State is taking non-marital property for private use (i.e., attorneys' fees), and readily admits it is arbitrary based solely on the judge's whim.  Beyer v. Parkis, 324 Ill.App.3d 305 (2001).

The Child Support Statutes, Maintenance Statues, and Attorneys' Fees Statutes Constitute a Threat of Imprisonment for Debt

35. The Wealth Transfer Statutes are unconstitutional per se and as applied in that they constitute an ongoing threat by the State of imprisonment for debt in violation of the Illinois Constitution (Article I, section 14).  The statutes denominate the duties as an obligation.  Inherent in that obligation is that money is due and payable, which is the definition of debt.  If Brian opposes the sum certain ordered (e.g., believing that his child would be adequately cared for for less), he subjects himself to the certainty of imprisonment.  While the courts denominate this action as "contempt of court," the outcome is indistinguishable from imprisonment for debt.

36. Brian contends that the State's primary interest in these statutes is to provide SIGNIFICANT income to "officers of the court" (i.e., attorneys), who provide free or low-cost services for the indigent of the State for the benefit of the State.  In Re Petition For Fees In: People v. Johnson, 93 Ill. App.3d 848 (1981).  In other words, the way the State and judges pay the attorneys back for their support is to infringe on fundamental Rights, encourage litigious and "out of control" environments, and take private property to give to attorneys.  The referenced statutes encourage officers of the court (i.e., attorneys) to encourage conflict between the parties, and thus a litigious environment, as they will be the PRIMARY BENEFACTORS of such an environment under the statutes, which is contrary to the legislature's stated intent.  The reviewing courts openly agree and admit that most divorce litigation is "completely out of control."  In re the Marriage of Emily Auriemma, 271 Ill. App. 3d 68 (1994).

The Maintenance Statutes and Attorneys' Fees Statutes Are Unconstitutional as They Constitute Involuntary Servitude

37. Maintenance and attorneys' fees constitute involuntary servitude in that they allow, based on "need" and "ability," one non-related person complete use and enjoyment of another non-related person's property, against his will.  The difference between a slave and a free person is that a free person owns what he produces and a slave does not.  The Thirteenth Amendment states that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."  Hodges v. United States, 203 US 1 (1906).  According to Merriam-Webster's dictionary, involuntary means "done contrary to or without choice," and servitude means "a right by which something (as a piece of land) owned by one person is subject to a specified use or enjoyment by another."  In the words of Hodges, "this is as clear as language can make it."

Respectfully submitted,

UCC 1-207, All Rights Reserved[6]

Brian M. Lovett, Petitioner

Brian Lovett
600 W Surf St 4
Chicago, Illinois 60657-5366
(312) 245-7982
blovett@gsb.uchicago.edu
Atty. No.  #99500